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NOTES AND COMMENTS

intent on his part would defeat the plaintiff. Indeed, the court seems
to have overlooked altogether the question of the plaintiff's original
state of mind.
In Thomas v. Thomasville Shooting Club2" the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld an instruction that:
If Thomas did not at the time intend to charge for getting up the
leases, and this was known to the defendant, then lie could not
charge and recover for same, but if it was not known to the
defendant that Thomas did not intend to charge, then Thomas
could afterwards
sue for and recover for his services in getting
2
up the leases. '
This appears to be a unique rule, enabling the plaintiff to change
his mind in order to recover for a benefit he originally intended as a
gift.
Where one bestows benefits gratuitously with full appreciation
of the facts it should not be the policy of the law to allow him to be
reimbursed,2 as was done in Thomas. But when one has a gratuitous intent because of a misapprehension of attendant circumstances, the principal case should govern and that intent alone should
not bar his recovery.
The result of the Deskovick case appeals to the layman's rough
sense of justice.

Should such a case arise in North Carolina, 2 it

should be recognized as grounded on quasi-contract, and the donor's
original benevolent motives should not defeat him in court, so long
as he was misled in the formulation of those motives.
SCOTT N. BROWN, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Scope of Immunity from Actions at
Law-The Question of Borrowed Servants
A landowner, constructing a storage plant for use in its business,
employed a crew to lay water and sewer pipe on the construction site.
" 121 N.C. 238, 28 S.E. 293 (1897).
2_Id. at 240, 28 S.E. at 294.
See Meier v. Planer, 107 N.J. Eq. 398, 152 AUt. 246 (Ch. 1930);
Everitt v. Walker, 109 N.C. 129, 13 S.E. 860 (1891); Trustees of the
University v. McNair's Executors, 37 N.C. 605 (1843).
" See Basinger v. Pharr, 225 N.C. 531, 35 S.E.2d 626 (1945). In that
case the plaintiff had brought an action to recover money advanced by him on
2

behalf of his father for medical expenses, etc., incurred by the latter during
his last illness. In the same action the plaintiff sought recovery of an advance made directly to the decedent. The lower court non-suited the plaintiff as to both items, and he appealed only as to the second, leaving open the
precise question presented by Deskovick.
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Digging the ditches for this pipe was a nineteen-ton "backhoe"
rented by the landowner under a written contract whereby the
machine was furnished with an operator and fuel at a specified
hourly cost. A member of the pipe-laying crew suffered fatal injuries when he was partially crushed under the crawler tracks of the
"backhoe." Plaintiff, administratrix of the employee's estate, instituted a wrongful death action against the operator of the machine
on the basis of his alleged negligence and the owner of the machine
under respondeat superior. Defendants, alleging plaintiff's sole
remedy to be found under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
claimed immunity from action at law.' judgment of involuntary
nonsuit was reversed in Weaver v. Bennett.2 The North Carolina
Supreme Court held that plaintiff's evidence did not affirmatively
show that the operator was conducting the business of intestate's
employer within the meaning of General Statutes section 97-9 and
therefore immune from suit.'
The variety of employment practices in the construction industry
presents with increasing regularity4 the question of the principal
case: does coverage under Workmen's Compensation preclude an
action at law by an injured employee against the person whose
negligence caused the injury? A conflict results between the fault
concept of tort liability and the theory of enterprise liability," which
is the basis of Workmen's Compensation." The conflict arises be' "Every employer . . .or those conducting his business shall only be
liable to any employee who elects to come under this article for personal
injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
2259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963).
3
Id.at 30, 129 S.E.2d at 620.
"Smith v. John B. Kelley, Inc., 275 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(concurring opinion); Larson, "Model-T" Compensation Acts in the
Atomic Age, 18 NACCA L.J. 39, 44 (1956).
'See HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 12.1-13.7 (1956).
6"The philosophy which supports the Workmen's Compensation Act
is 'that the wear and tear of human beings in modern industry should be
charged to the industry, just as the wear and tear of machinery has always
been charged. And while such compensation is presumably charged to the
industry, and consequently to the employer or owner of the industry, eventually it becomes a part of the fair money cost of the industrial product, to be
paid for by the general public patronizing such products.'" Vause v. Vause
Farm Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92; 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951). But see
Whitte, The Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 20 AM. LAB. LEG. REv.
411 (1930) indicating that it is the employer and not the consumer who
bears the burden of compensation. For discussion of the theory of nonemployers' liability in actions at law, see McCoid, The Third Person in the
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cause of statutory provisions limiting actions at law against those
responsible for injuries covered by Workmen's Compensation. 7 In
the majority of jurisdictions employers are immune from actions
at law.' But fellow employees, 9 principal contractors, 10 subcontractors,"' independent contractors,'" and their employees' s may be
amenable to suit, depending on the provisions of the statutes involved. 4
Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of NonEmployers, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 389, 395-403 (1959).
"See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39 (Supp. 1962) (recognizing a right
of action against a "third party"); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 15 (1957)
(recognizing a right of action against a "person other than the insured");
see generally 2 LARSON, LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 72.00-.70
(1952); 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 842 (perm. ed.
1943).
'1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 90 (perm. ed. 1941);
see, e.g., McNair v. Ward, 240 N.C. 330, 82 S.E.2d 85 (1954).
9For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Rylander v. Chicago Short
Line Ry., 17 Ill. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812 (1959); Bresnahan v. Barre, 286
Mass. 593, 190 N.E. 815 (1934); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d
106 (1946). For cases allowing action at law, see, e.g., Kimbo v. Holladay,
154 So. 369 (La. App. 1934) ; Gee v. Horvath, 169 Ohio St. 14, 157 N.E.2d
354 (1959) ; Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 AtI. 130 (1929).
"0For cases granting immunity, generally the result where the contractor
is directly responsible for the payment of compensation benefits, see, e.g.,
Adams v. Hercules Powder Co., 180 Tenn. 340, 175 S.W.2d 319 (1943);
Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 41 S.E.2d 469 (1947).
For cases allowing action at law, generally the result in -the absence of a
direct statutory liability for compensation benefits, see, e.g., Clark v.
Monarch Eng'r Co., 248 N.Y. 107, 161 N.E. 436 (1928) ; Cathey v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 218 N.C. 525, 11 S.E.2d 571 (1940). N.C. GN. STAT.
§ 97-19 (1958) extends qualified statutory liability for compensation benefits
only to principal contractors, intermediate contractors, and subcontractors.
For discussion suggesting inclusion of owners and principal employers, see
35 N.C.L. REv. 569 (1957).
"For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal
Co. v. Kindt, 48 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1950); Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96
S.E.2d 92 (1957). For cases allowing action at law, see, e.g., Davison v.
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 169 Kan. 256, 218 P.2d 219 (1950); Dillman v.
John Diebold & Sons Stone Co., 241 Kjr. 631, 44 S.W.2d 581 (1931); Olsen
v. Sharpe, 191 Tenn. 503, 235 S.W.2d 11 (1950).
"'For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Doane v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 209 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1954); Williams v. E. T. Gresham
Co., 201 Va. 457, 111 S.E.2d 498 (1959). For cases allowing action at law,
see, e.g., Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 100 S.E.2d 37 (1957).
"'For cases granting immunity, see, e.g., Doane v. E. L DuPont de
Nemours & Co., supra note 12; Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt,
48 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1950); Williams v. E. T. Gresham Co., supra note 12.
For cases allowing action at law, see, e.g., Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
supra note 12; Olsen v. Sharpe, 191 Tenn. 503, 235 S.W.2d 11 (1950);
Kramer v. Kramer, supra note 12.
" See 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 72.00-.70; 3 SCHNEIDER, op. cit.
supra note 7, § 842.
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Section 97-9 of the General Statutes confers immunity on the
employer and "those conducting his business" 5 When first interpreting that phrase, the North Carolina Supreme Court included
fellow employees within its meaning 8 and called for its liberal construction."' Early interpretations arose in actions by or on behalf
of employees where the defendants unsuccessfully sought to join the
employees' employers, superiors," and fellow employees.1" Later
the court held that an employee could not maintain an action at law
against a fellow employee responsible for his compensable injury. 20
Immunity for fellow employees and superiors receives support as a
furtherance of the purpose of Workmen's Compensation, because
without it the cost of injury shifts from the enterprise to its individual workers."
In the principal case, the court concluded that the operator
of
the "backhoe" was not conducting the landowner's business because
he had not become the landowner's borrowed servant.22 Thus, application of the borrowed servant doctrine" apparently limits the
scope of the phrase, ""those conducting his business," to employees,
yet it is an imprecise phase adaptable to broader interpretation. The
""Every employer . . or those conducting his business shall only be
liable to any employee who elects to come under this article for personal
injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
7'

Essick v.Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).

"We have no space to call attention to the contradictions and fantastic
situations that must arise under the application of G.S. 97-10 unless 97-9 is
given its weight in an in pari inateria interpretation of both sections, and
the immunity given in Section 97-9 to 'those conducting the [sic] business'
be given a liberal construction and its definitions and intendments carried
through the provisions of 97-10." Id. at 210, 60 S.E.2d at 113. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-10.1, 97-10.2, as amended, N.C. SEss. LAws 1963, ch. 450, § 1,
97-10.3 (Supp. 1961), replaces N.C. Snss. LAws 1929, ch. 120, § 11, as
amended, N.C. SEss. LAws 1933, ch. 449, § 1, as amended, N.C. SESs. LAWS
1943, ch. 662, repealed by N.C. SEss. LAws 1959, ch. 1324. For discussion
of the change, see Comments on North Carolina 1959 Session Laws, 38
N.C.L. REv. 154, 242 (1960).
" Essick v. Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).
"Bass v. Ingold, 232 N.C. 295, 60 S.E.2d 114 (1950).
" Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952), 30 N.C.L. Rnv.
474.
"See 43 IoWA L. Rv. 352 (1958); 30 N.C.L. REv. 474 (1952); 39
VA.L. REv. 951 (1953); 17 WASH.& LEE L. IRv. 315 (1960); But see 1
WILL. & MARY L. REv. 123 (1957).
"Weaver v.Bennett, 259 N.C. 16, 30, 129 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1963).
" "A person, natural or corporate, may lend or let a servant to another
insuch a way as to be relieved from liability arising out of injury to another
through the negligence of the servant." Leonard v. Tatum & Dalton Transfer
Co., 218 N.C. 667, 671, 12 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1940) (dictum).
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borrowed servant doctrine, itself imprecise and chaotic,24 has been.
applied by the courts to determine liability under respondeat superior
through various tests, generally falling into three classifications. 5
The first is the "control" test, which may mean either "broad" 28 or
"spot" 27 control. Second is the "whose business" test, 28 and finally
is that test which is a combination of the two.2 9
North Carolina decisions relieving lending masters of liability
under respondeatsuperior are based on the supervision, control, and
direction exercised by the borrowing masters in situations where the
lending masters relinguished authority to direct the servants' manner
or method of performance. 30 Thus, having the power of immediate
direction and control brings liability to a borrowing master."1 But
2 "The law that defines or seeks to define the distinction between general and special employers is beset with distinctions so delicate that chaos is
the consequence. No lawyer can say with assurance in any given situation
where one employment ends and the other begins. The wrong choice of
defendants is often made, with instances, all too many, in which justice has
miscarried." Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 121
(1921). See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1388 (1951).
2 See Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dictum); Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951) (dictum);
Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MIcH.
L. REv. 1222, 1230-34 (1940).
28 See, e.g., Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 25;
Hodge v.
McGuire, 235 N.C. 132, 69 S.E.2d 227 (1952). This test relies on "control
in the broad sense of hiring, training, and firing." Smith, supra note 25, at
1230.
. See, e.g., Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951);
Wadford v. Gregory Chandler Co., 213 N.C. 802, 196 S.E. 815 (1938). This
test relies on "control exercised by the man on the spot, the man who says
when and where to go and how fast." Smith, supra note 25, at 1230. "The
control test .

.

. in principle is medieval, inextricably mixed with the now-

discredited 'command' rationale of vicarious liability. In application it is
uncertain and ambiguous." Smith, supra note 25, at 1233.
28 See, e.g., Devaney v. Lawler Corp., 101 Mont. 579, 56 P.2d 746
(1936); Jones v. Henderson Tobacco Co., 231 N.C. 336, 56 S.E.2d 598
(1949). This test relies on "Whose business is being done by the borrowed
servant ?" Smith, supra note 25, at 1233. "The only trouble with the whose
business test is that, in difficulty of application, it is as bad as the control
test. The results are unpredictable, uncertain, and in many cases probably
unjust." Smith, supra note 25, at 1234.
" See, e.g., Denton v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R., 284 U.S. 305
(1932); Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1905). "To determine whether a given case falls within the one class or the other we must
inquire whose is the work being performed, a question which is usually
answered by ascertaining who has the power to control and direct the
servants in the performance of their work." Id. at 221.
so Wadford v. Gregory Chandler Co., 213 N.C. 802, 196 S.E. 815 (1938);
Shapiro
v. Winston-Salem, 212 N.C. 751, 194 S.E. 479 (1938).
8
Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
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a lending master who retains the right to control is held liable for
the servant's torts.32 On one occasion the court applied the "whose
business" test in holding that a servant was not loaned to the party
sought to be held,3" but "control" generally determines liability
84
under respondeat superior in North Carolina.
Therefore, in the principal case the court correctly spoke of
control as decisive had the issue been solely whether or not the
lessor of the "backhoe" was liable for the operator's negligence.
The issue under the Workmen's Compensation Act immunity provision, however, is whether or not the operator was conducting the
lessee's business. Thus, regardless of the North Carolina criteria
for determining borrowed servants, the language of section 97-93"
suggests application of a test analogous to the "whose business"
test.
Virginia, like North Carolina, has a provision in its Workmen's
Compensation Act granting immunity to the employer and "those
conducting his business."' Construction of the phrase began there
2"Hodge v. McGuire, 235 N.C. 132, 69 S.E.2d 227 (1952); accord,
Leonard v. Tatum & Dalton Transfer Co., 218 N.C. 667, 12 S.E.2d 729
(1940) where defendant retained the right to control because he had not "so
completely surrendered as to virtually suspend, temporarily, at least, any
responsibility which might reasonably be associated with control." Id. at
671, 12 S.E.2d at 731. "To us, when the principle is tested by the elements
stated above [complete surrender of control by the master, renunciation of all
obedience to the master by the servant], the result is the destruction of the
principle. When a master turns an employee to another's service under the
tests outlined, it is not a loan of the servant, it is a complete giving up of
the servant, a termination of any relationship between the hiring master
and the servant. It would be an out and out change of employment. It
would be a discharge from one master and a hiring by another." WylieStewart Mach. Co. v. Thomas, 192 Okla. 505, 507, 137 P.2d 556, 558 (1943)
(dictum).
38 See Jones v. Henderson Tobacco Co., 231 N.C. 336, 56 S.E.2d
598
(1949) ; see also Liverman v. Cline, 212 N.C. 43, 192 S.E. 849 (1937).
"The control test has also been applied to distinguish independent contractors from servants. Harris v. White Constr. Co., 240 N.C. 556, 82
S.E.2d 689 (1954); Hinlde v. Lexington, 239 N.C. 105, 79 S.E.2d 220
(1953); Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944); Lassiter
v. Cline, 222 N.C. 271, 22 S.E.2d 558 (1942). Compare Liverman v. Cline,
supra note 33.
""Every employer . . . or those conducting his business shall only be
liable to any employee who elects to come under this article for personal
injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified."

N.C. GEN.

S AT.

§ 97-9 (1958).

(Emphasis added.)

"d"While such insurance remains in force he [the employer] or those
conducting his business shall be liable to an employee for personal injury
or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified." VA.
CODE ANN.

§ 65-99 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
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as in North Carolina when its meaning was held to encompass fellow
employees.
In a later application of Virginia law, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reached a result
similar to that of the principal case when it held that an employee
of a landowner could maintain an action at law against the operator
of a bulldozer leased by the landowner, notwithstanding coverage
by Workmen's Compensation." The Virginia court refused to
follow that decision when faced with this problem. The principal
contractor on a school project leased a crane and operator at a
specified hourly rate. An employee of the principal contractor was
injured and brought action against the operator and the owner of
the crane. Basing its decision on prior interpretations of the Virginia act's immunity provision, 9 the court upheld immunity as a
complete defense." Expressly excluded from consideration was the
borrowed servant doctrine."'
In a later Virginia case,42 the court again granted immunity
to the lessor of a crane without considering whether the operator
had become the borrowed servant of the lessee. Action at law was
not allowed because the defendant was engaged in work which was
part of the trade, business, or occupation of the lessee, plaintiff's
employer, and was therefore conducting his business.3 This test
"'Fetig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946).
:'Hav v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
9Immunity was granted in Doane v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
209 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1954) (independent contractor); Sykes v. Stone &
Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 41 S.E.2d 469 (1947) (general contractor); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946) (fellow
employee). . "The purpose of the Virginia statute as interpreted by its
highest court is to limit the recovery of all persons engaged in the business
under consideration to compensation under the act, and to deny an injured
person the right of recovery against any other person unless he be a stranger
to the business." Doane v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra at 926
(dictum). (Emphasis added.)
Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d 92 (1957), 43 VA. L. Rxv. 619.
' "The view we have taken of the matter makes it unnecessary to consider whether in the present case at the time of the accident the crane
operator was the loaned employee of the principal contractor, Daniel, and
the fellow servant of Rea, and if so, what effect that had upon the right
of the plaintiff administratrix to maintain the present action at law." Id. at
718, 96 S.E.2d at 96.
,Williams v. E. T. Gresham Co., 201 Va. 457, 111 S.E.2d 498 (1959).
"The application of the "trade, business, or occupation" test does not
always result in immunity. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace, 172 F.2d
802 (4th Cir. 1949). Compare Anderson v. Thorington Constr. Co., 201
Va. 266, 110 S.E.2d 396 (1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 719 (1960),
with Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 100 S.E.2d 37 (1957). See generally
King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 30 A.2d 549 (1943).
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Moreover, it places the cost
conf orms to -the statutory language.
the single enterprise in which the parties were engaged.
of'irijury
If, the on
industry in which an injury arises is to bear the burden
of that injury, it is insignificant that a machine necessary to that
industry is not operated by an employee or a borrowed servant.,
When the question for determination is whether a machine operator
is- conducting the business of the machine's lessee, an inquiry as to
the right to control the operator answers little.4" Perhaps the decision of the principal case reflects doubt over the adequacy of Workmen's Compensation benefits. If so, it joins leading writers who call
for a complete re-evaluation of Workmen's Compensation Acts. 40
Discussion of the manifold problems of the acts is beyond the scope
of this note. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the legislature should
examine the immunity question in light of present employment
practices and effect changes manifesting its intent in definitive
language.
ARcHi T. ALLEN, III
"See notes 35 & 36 supra.

""The earlier cases tested this relationship [employer-employee] through'
application of the 'control' factor, originally a test for tortious liability,
having its roots in the relationship of the apprentice to his master in early
English industrial society.' As applied to today's complex economy of the
assembly line, of dispersed industrial operations, of concentrated operations
but with gemi-autonomous 'departments' or branches, and of general contractors who, in turn, employ subcontractors and sub-subcontractors, the
'control' test is often meaningless, usually ambiguous, and always susceptible
of paperwriting evasions. Consequently we have abandoned it." Schulte
v. American Box Board Co., 358 Mich. 21, 32, 99 N.W.2d 367, 372 (1959)
(concurring opinion) ,
" See Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation As Social
Insurance: A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wxs. L. REv.
57;. Larson, "Model-T" Compensation Acts in the Atomic Age, 18 NACCA
L.J. 39 (1956); Riesenfeld, Efficacy and Costs of Workmen's Compensation,

49 CALIF. L. REv. 631 (1961). For suggestion of the abolition of employers'
immunity, see Marcus, Advocating the Rights of the Injured, 61 MxcH. L.
R3zv. 921 (1963).

